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THE ILLOGICAL AND SEXIST QTIP
PROVISIONS: I JUST CAN'T SAY IT AIN'T SO
WENDY C. GERZOG*
Professor Zelenak and I agree on one half of my thesis: that the
qualified terminable interest property ("QTIP") provisions are
illogical and do not serve their purported public policy goal.' They
were based on the premise that a married couple acts as a unit about
"their" property and, quite obviously, they were motivated by the
fear that in fact husband and wife do not.' However, Professor
Zelenak disagrees with the other half of my thesis: that the QTIP
provisions are degrading to women, sexist, and financially
unrewarding to widows.3 While he would like to separate these two
ideas, the sexism of the statute is, to a large degree, intertwined with
its illogic. 4
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Joseph M. Dodge for his most encouraging and helpful comments on all of my
QTIP articles. I would also like to thank my colleagues, Professors Fred Brown, John A.
Lynch, Jr., and Walter Schwidetzky, for their continual support and critiques of my work.
Finally, I would like to thank Barbara Jones for her secretarial skills and patience.
1. See Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and
Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 304 (1995); Lawrence Zelenak, Taking
Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1521,1544 (1998).
2. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 303-04, 318-19, 326. The goal of the marital
deduction is to tax property when it leaves the marital "unit;" because the QTIP does not
express marital unity, the proper time to tax the property is when the property leaves the
"unit" and that is when the husband, and not the widow, dies. See id. at 318-19.
3. See id. at 306, 320-27; Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1544-48. Professor Zelenak
decries scholarship that he contends displays "an overeagerness to accuse the tax laws of
hostility to women." Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1523. However, Professor Zelenak is
"overeager" to cast me as a feminist and to give me a political agenda. He says that I
have "fail[ed] to prove [my] feminist casef against the QTIP." Id. at 1544. By inventing
motives for me, Zelenak ironically does what he disdains. So anxious to prove that
feminist writers are knee-jerk in their responses, he reads a piece that forms feminist
conclusions and is too quick to exclaim that it is an example of a feminist trying to
superimpose feminist ideology on the Code. In his stereotyping, he fails to consider the
alternative possibility: that a woman scholar could find gender bias without herself being
a feminist.
4. Professor Zelenak would separate the two interrelated points that my article
makes. He sees the non-sexist illogic of the provision as negating "the assumption of
spousal unity upon which the marital deduction is based," but does not see the logical
conclusion that the statute is sexist. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1544. If the next step of an
argument, however, is to show research that this fiction of the marital unit is rooted in a
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The QTIP provisions are degrading to women and sexist for two
reasons: (1) they treat women as the invisible member of a marital
unit; and (2) they implicitly equate giving an income interest to
women with giving them the property itself.
Women are treated as the invisible member of a marital unit
when, purportedly enacted because husbands and wives share
decisions about "their" property, the QTIP provisions actually enable
the husband alone to control the ultimate disposition of "their"
property. Women are treated as the invisible member of a marital
unit when it is the donor or the executor and not the wife or the
widow who makes the QTIP election.5
The QTIP provisions implicitly equate giving an income interest
to women with giving them the property itself. As an exception to
the terminable interest rule, unlike the other exceptions where the
widow is given a rough equivalent to outright ownership of the
property itself, the QTIP provisions allow a marital deduction for the
full fair market value of the property at the husband's death even
though the wife, the other half of the marital unit, does not receive
the property but only the income interest in that property.
At the heart of Professor Zelenak's inability to perceive any
sexism in the statute is, perhaps, a general assumption that it is the
husband who made the money, it is his money alone, and he has
every right to control where it ultimately goes. However, this
assumption is in direct opposition to the central argument made for
the unlimited marital deduction: that both husband and wife
considered property acquired during their marriage as "theirs" rather
than the property of just the earner spouse.6 If it is their property
and not just his, despite his being the sole or main income earner,
then the QTIP provisions that have him in the role of sole decision-
maker are sexist and degrading to women.
Professor Zelenak suggests that half a loaf is better than none or
that receiving an income interest is better than receiving none of the
property,7 but that really begs the question. Half a loaf is half a loaf;
an income interest is only an income interest. It is the "new math" of
man's desire to control the marital unit, surely it "necessarily" follows that "the QTIP
rules are sexist." When I began my research, I merely thought the QTIP provisions were
illogical and wanted to find an explanation. I soon was immersed in evidence, convincing
to me, that their illogic could only be explained by what I discovered to be their sexist
origin, intent, and consequence. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 320-27.
5. I state in my article that the executor and the widow may in fact be the same
person; however, they are not required to be so. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 325.
6. See id. at 303.
7. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1545-48.
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the QTIP provisions that is both illogical and degrading to women;
despite giving the widow only an income interest, the husband's
estate is entitled to a "marital" deduction for the full value of the
property. Thus, under the QTIP provisions, half a loaf is equal to a
full loaf; an income interest is equal to the property itself.
Professor Zelenak acknowledges that he is unsure whether
widows would fare better with or without the QTIP provisions
although his "intuition is that widows probably fare better with the
QTIP than they would without."' He creates a hypothetical situation
in which the husband would be willing to leave $1 million in a QTIP
trust, but would leave either the full $1 million or nothing with equal
probability if there were no QTIP statute. That particular
hypothetical, however, is artificial. It assumes that fifty out of one
hundred men would actually leave nothing to their wives and that is
simply ridiculous.
Instead of Professor Zelenak's coin toss, consider a situation in
which the husband cares about his wife's welfare, but also wants
some say in how much will go to his children. Assume that he has a
$1.6 million estate and plans to leave $600,000 of that amount tax-
free to his children.9 If there were no QTIP statute, he would have to
decide how to split the remaining $1 million. He knows that if he
transfers the $1 million to his children, they will actually receive only
about half of that amount, with the remainder going directly to the
government. He also knows that if he leaves the $1 million to his
wife, she will receive the full $1 million and that at her death she
could transfer another $600,000 tax-free to his children, which is
about $100,000 more than he could have left them directly. Finally,
he knows that his wife might elect her statutory share if he leaves her
too little. Given that dilemma, is it really a leap to suggest that this
coin toss is one with a weighted coin?
Regardless of the coin toss theory, moreover, if the husband
disinherits his wife, he gets no tax benefit for doing so; hence, the tax
laws do not encourage such action. If he gives his wife less than an
ownership equivalent in his property and if there were no QTIP
legislation, he would be receiving no tax benefit for such transfer.
Professor Zelenak intuits that the widow benefits from the QTIP
in an enlarged income interest.10 However, if it is so much in the
8. Id. at 1546.
9. Prior to the enactment of § 501 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-34, § 501, 111 Stat. 788, 845 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), the
unified credit sheltered $600,000 worth of taxable transfers. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1994).
10. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1546-48. With the Tax Court's concession in Estate
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widow's interest to make a QTIP election, why is she not given even
that choice? As I stated in my article, "[a]t a minimum, Congress
should only allow the marital deduction where the transferor's spouse
must agree both to the identity of the recipient and to a QTIP
election.""
My conclusion that it is more likely that the husband will give his
wife a rough equivalent to ownership in at least most of his property
also rests on the statements that are part of the legislative history of
the QTIP provisions, on the influence of estate planners on their
clients, and on statistics showing the popularity of the marital
deduction before the QTIP's enactment when the husband had to
transfer the underlying property to receive the marital deduction.
While the legislative history emphasizes the husband's dilemma
itself, one finds such statements as that offered by the American Bar
Association's Tax Section Chairman and Chairman-elect during the
1981 Senate Hearings, that with the contemporaneous enactment of
the unlimited marital deduction, there would be "a greater
inducement to give 'all' to the surviving spouse and not provide for
children."'12 Donald Thurman of the American Bankers Association
said, "[i]f the marital deduction were made unlimited, the 'tax pull'
would be substantial to make full use of the deduction. '13
Moreover, because of the complexity of the tax laws, the
influence of estate planners on their clients is great. If the marital
deduction were only available for fee simple property transfers,
estate planners would be urging their clients to make such transfers.
When a couple seeks estate planning advice today, even in the
climate of multiple marriages, most people want to leave the bulk of
their property to their spouse. Yet, many men are counseled to give
of Clack v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 131, 141 (1996), and with the proposed Treasury
regulation embodying that decision, see Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2044-1, 20.2056(b)-7,
20.2056(b)-10, 62 Fed. Reg. 7188 (1997), the widow is not even assured an income interest
in a QTIP trust if the executor, often a third party such as the decedent's child from an
earlier marriage, chooses not to give her even that benefit. Clack and the proposed
regulation extend the marital deduction to QTIP trusts with contingent income interests,
that is, to trusts wherein the widow will only receive an income interest if the executor
makes a QTIP election. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of Clack: Adding Insult to Injury,
or More Problems with the QTIP Tax Provisions, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
221,246-47 (1996).
11. Gerzog, supra note 1, at 327.
12. Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Estate and
Gift Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance (pt. 2), 97th Cong. 156, 179 (1981) (joint
statement of Harvie Branscomb, Jr. and John S. Nolan, Chairman & Chairman-elect,
Section of Taxation, American Bar Association).
13. Id. at 159.
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their wives only a life estate in the form of a QTIP trust. 4
The statistics indicate that the marital deduction was, and
continues to be,15 a popular tax benefit. For example, just prior to
1976, when the marital deduction was only allowed to the extent of
one-half of the decedent's estate, the statistics show that "[m]arried
men, on average left (or the court distributed) sixty-five percent of
their estate to their surviving spouses." 6  Although they only
received a marital deduction for fifty percent of their estate in 1976,
nevertheless, husbands wanted to give most of their property to their
widows.
Most significantly, however, Professor Zelenak ignores the
benefit inherent in the QTIP provisions that allows the husband to
utilize two unified credits as well as two generation-skipping transfer
tax exemptions, where the widow owns little property of her own,
without even consulting his wife. That is, by means of the QTIP
14. According to Professor Ordower, estate planners use the QTIP trust for almost
half of their clients, and he infers that the suggestion to do so comes from the attorney.
See Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate Planning
Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 313,315 n.3 (1996).
15. The marital deduction is still the largest deduction taken by decedents. See
Martha Britton Eller, Federal Taxation of Wealth Transfers, 1992-1995, IRS STAT.
INCOME BULL., Winter 1996-97, at 8, 16. The marital deduction represented 67.8% of the
total deductions taken by all decedents and 79.2% of the total deductions of nontaxable
estates. See id.; see also id. at 27 tbl.la (providing 1992 marital deduction data); id. at 33
tbl.lb (providing 1993 marital deduction data); id. at 39 tbl.lc (providing 1994 marital
deduction data); id. at 45 tbl.ld (providing 1995 marital deduction data). In 1992, for
example, although men owned 61.5% of the total gross estate for all decedents, women
paid $5.8 billion, as compared to the $4.7 billion paid by men, in estate tax liabilities. See
id. at 12. Martha Eller notes that
[a]t least part of this sex-specific differential in combined estate tax liability is
attributable to the unlimited marital deduction, available to decedents who are
married at death.... And, since the largest group of male decedents in the 1992
estate tax decedent population was married males, it seems reasonable that
these male decedents used the marital deduction to avoid estate taxation, at
least until the deaths of their surviving spouses.
Id. Of male estate tax decedents, 65.8% were married, and married men comprised
37.2% of all estate tax decedents. See id. These figures contrast with married women
constituting 23.9% of women decedents and 10.4% of all decedents. See id. "The
majority of female decedents (16,063 women) were widowed at death." Id. Since there
were 26,115 female estate tax decedents in 1992, widows represented 61.5% of that group.
See id. at 12-13. Widows who were the "probable recipients of non-taxable marital
bequests by previously deceased husbands, were responsible for postponed estate tax
liabilities." Id. at 13.
16. Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Public Hearings and Panel Discussions Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means (pt. 2), 94th Cong. 1309, 1327 (1976) (statement of Prof.
James D. Smith, Senior Researcher, Urban Institute, Washington, D.C. and Department of
Economics, Pennsylvania State University). Married women left approximately 50% of
their estates to their husbands. See id.
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provisions, he is able to make a $600,000 transfer to his children tax-
free in his own estate and then he makes another $600,000 transfer to
his children tax-free when his widow dies. If she is not the mother of
his children and has no say in the matter, it is hard to find a cogent
policy reason for such a benefit.
Thus, regardless of whether the widow receives a larger income
interest from a QTIP election, the decedent's children receive a
totally unwarranted benefit. 7 It is because third parties are the
intended beneficiaries of the QTIP provisions that I find the statute
particularly inequitable. On this subject, my article underlines the
inequity created by the QTIP statutes between an unmarried and a
married parent. 8 The QTIP provisions allow a tax benefit to the
married parent only because of his marital status for a transfer made
to his children; there is no such benefit available to an unmarried
parent who transfers property to his children.
The unlimited marital deduction was justified on the bases of the
marital relationship and tracing problems; 19 by contrast, the QTIP
provisions are not premised on these rationales. It is solely marital
status that enables a married father to transfer more property tax-
free to his children, a benefit denied to unmarried fathers. Since all
transfers outside the marital unit should be taxed equally, eliminating
the QTIP would be equitable and logical.2"
In the remainder of this response, I would like to address a few
of the specific criticisms Professor Zelenak makes about my article:
that my "smoking gun" shoots blanks;21 that there is nothing
degrading about second wives thinking independently of their
husbands;' that I am even more condescending to women than the
QTIP provisions themselves;' and that whining about the
mistreatment of wealthy white women is unworthy of a true
feminist.24
17. Indeed, if it were not so, where the executor is the decedent's child from an
earlier marriage, he would have little incentive to make the QTIP election.
18. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 304,326-27.
19. See id. at 308-09. Congress recognized that it was often difficult to determine the
proportion of funds each spouse provided in order to acquire some of their property; it
was also difficult, in some cases, to be certain which spouse actually owned the property.
See id. at 309 n.30.
20. While Professor Zelenak would seem to allow for non-sexist conclusions such as
this one, he bisects my article in a way it was never intended to be read. See Zelenak,
supra note 1, at 1543-44; supra note 4.
21. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
22. See id. at 1545.
23. See id. at 1545 n.125.
24. See id. at 1548-49.
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Professor Zelenak zooms in on one quote which prefaces the
section in my article discussing the sexist origins of the QTIP
provisions and he denounces it as shallow proof of QTIP sexism7
However, this introductory quote was never intended to be my
"smoking gun" or central to my "proof' of that statute's degrading
concept of women. I know and state that the quote was written by
someone who did not write the 1960s prototype of the QTIP
provisions.26 But Professor Zelenak stops reading here and ignores
the second paragraph on page 320 as well as the text and notes on
pages 321 through 325.27 Indeed, this section of my article does not
elaborate on the theme of "widow as charlatan prey" that Professor
Zelenak alone sets up as a paper tiger and then attacks.' Rather, this
section indicates where in the legislative history of the QTIP
provisions there is hard evidence of gender bias.
In response to Professor Zelenak's criticism that the preface
25. See id. at 1544. The entire quote which prefaces section IV of my QTIP article
reads:
"There are few men in common law states who are willing to grant their widows
more than a life estate where there are surviving children. They do not want to
grant the widow a life estate plus a general power of appointment as that in
effect is to give her the fee simple, and the widow who has unfettered power to
dispose of the property may do so and cut off the interest of the children. There
are many widows in this country who are experienced and astute in the
management of property and business affairs. But there are many more who
have been active only in domestic circles and who lack the experience and
judgment to suddenly assume outright ownership and disposal of substantial
properties. The tax law should not offer a premium to a husband who ignores his
better judgment and grants his widow a general power of appointment leaving his
children at the mercy of any charlatan who has his widow's ear."
Gerzog, supra note 1, at 320 (emphasis in original) (quoting John W. Beveridge, The
Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Beneficent Intent, Baneful Result, 44 TAXEs 283, 284
(1966)).
26. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 320. The first paragraph of section IV of my QTIP
article reads:
It is amidst this climate of paternalism, which is degrading to women, that
the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) wrote its proposed changes in Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation. While Mr. Beveridge, author of the above quotation
and a co-author of treatises on Gift Taxation and Estate Taxation, was not on
the A.L.I. committees proposing the new exception to the terminable interest
rule, his words state the sentiment to which others merely allude.
Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, the editors of Taxes prefaced John Beveridge's article
with: "The author, an attorney in Fort Worth, Texas, presents here an article on estate
tax law and marital deduction which should be of interest to all lawyers in common law
states." Beveridge, supra note 25, at 283.
27. Professor Zelenak does, however, latch onto one sentence on page 325 which he
proceeds to take out of context and misread. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1545 n.125;
infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
28. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
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quote was written some fifteen years before the enactment of the
QTIP provisions,2 9 since the prototype of the QTIP provision was
indeed written some fifteen years prior to its enactment in 1981,30 it is
logical that a quote evoking the climate among tax practitioners in
the 1960s would be drawn from writings in those years.
So what proof did I offer in this section of my article to conclude
the sexist origins of the QTIP provisions? I reasoned that if the
"surviving spouse" was intended to be identified as a woman, and in
fact generally was a woman, there was gender bias in the QTIP
statute.' After all, the purpose of the statute is to offer a marital
deduction for a much more limited property interest than had
previously qualified for the marital deduction; so, if a husband was
encouraged to reduce what he transferred to his wife, the statute
shows gender bias. Likewise, if the surviving spouse is identified as
intended to be a woman, since it is the decedent and not the surviving
spouse who controls the ultimate disposition of the property and
since it is the executor and, again, not the surviving spouse who is
able to make a QTIP election, the statute reflects gender bias.
What evidence did I offer on pages 320 through 325 of my QTIP
article to show that intention of identity between "surviving spouse"
and women? First, all of the examples used in both the ALI Proposal
and the Treasury recommendations refer to husbands transferring
property to their widows.3 2  Second, all of the descriptions and
discussions in the ALI project as well as in the Treasury
recommendations identify the donee spouse as a woman.3 Third,
John Alexander, a consultant to the ALI and a commentator on the
ALI project, framed his criticisms in terms of a woman being
identified as the donee spouse.34 Fourth, the Treasury Department
provided statistics only on the number of years widows survived their
husbands and did not even mention or provide data on the number of
years widowers survived their wives.35 These were the facts I offered
29. See id. at 1544 ("But she has to go back fifteen years before the QTIP rules were
enacted....").
30. The prototype of the 1981 QTIP legislation is found in the 1960s ALI
recommendation to allow the marital deduction where the surviving spouse is granted
only the current beneficial interest in the property. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 321-24.
It is comparable to the 1981 requirement that, in order to qualify for the marital
deduction, the surviving spouse be given a qualifying income interest for life. See id. at
305,321-24.
31. See id. at 322.
32- See id.
33. See id. at 323.
34. See id. at 324 & nn.106-07.
35. See id. at 322.
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to explain how the framers of the QTIP prototype, by identifying the
"surviving spouse" as a woman, intended gender bias. 6
Not only did the creators of the QTIP prototype intend for a
woman to be the surviving spouse, but also she was in fact statistically
favored for that role. As I stated in several places in my article, since
women generally outlive their husbands, they will in fact fill that role
more often than men. 7 Because she would likely be the surviving
spouse in fact, the QTIEP provisions evince gender bias.
I agree with Professor Zelenak that it is not degrading to women
that, because a second wife does not share her husband's feelings
towards his children, he would want to transfer property to them
directly.38 What is degrading, however, is that he is offered a tax
benefit on the basis that he and his wife are making a joint decision
about "their" property when in reality he is making that decision and
she is treated as if she does not even exist. By enacting the QTIP
provisions, Congress is allowing the husband to transfer more
36. Moreover, I offered evidence that when Senator Symms introduced the QTIP
amendment in 1981, while he began with the gender neutral terms of "his or her," he then
slipped into language indicating that the donor would want to protect "his" property to
ensure that it goes to "his" children, indicating the gender of the donor as male and that
the desire was to protect "his" children. See id. at 322 n.95.
Likewise, the expansion of the marital deduction to eliminate the double taxation of
the surviving spouse pursuant to the 50% maximum marital deduction under pre-1981 law
was referred to as the "widow's tax." See id. at 309 n.31.
37. See id. at 305 n.11, 309. Women continue to outlive their husbands. In 1992,
females outlived male estate tax decedents by an average of 5.6 years and 61.5% of all
female estate tax decedents were widows. See Eller, supra note 15, at 12-13. In his
article, Professor Zelenak presents a hypothetical example to demonstrate that a widow
may do less well with a forced share of one-third of her husband's estate than with the
QTIP. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1547-48. He assumes that the husband has an estate
of $10 million, leaves $600,000 outright to his children, and leaves the remaining $9.4
million in a QTIP. See id. By assuming that the widow will outlive her husband by 11
years, he values the life estate at $3.9 million and concludes that the widow is benefiting
to the tune of about $500,000 over her one-third elective share of about $3.3 million. See
id. at 1548. Professor Zelenak uses the survival rate suggested by 1960s data of the
Treasury Department that was cited in my article, together with 1980s and 1990s census
statistics, merely to support the statement that women generally outlive their husbands.
See id. at 1548 n.136. While I do not have current data on the number of years widows
survive their estate tax decedents (the 5.6 year survival rate of all female estate tax
decedents includes more than just the widows, although they are clearly the largest group
of female estate tax decedents), the 11-year figure of nearly 30 years ago may well be
significantly less today. Using a six-year figure instead of the 11-year interest, the
widow's life estate is worth about $2.4 million, $900,000 less than the widow's $3.3 million
elective share (that is, the present value of a life estate in $9.4 million at the same 5%
discount rate). Even applying an eight-year survival figure, the widow's life estate is
worth $3.04 million, about $250,000 less than her elective share. At a nine-year survival
rate, the widow's life estate is roughly equal to her one-third statutory share.
3& See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1545.
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property to his children from a previous marriage on the supposed
justification that the transfer is a marital decision. What is degrading
is that Congress, by enacting the QTIP provisions giving the husband,
and not the couple, control over the ultimate disposition of the
property and giving the donor or the executor, and not the widow,
the right to make the QTIP election, is treating at least one half of
the marital unit as if she were invisible. Thus, it is not degrading to
indicate that second wives think independently of their husbands, but
a statute that allows them no chance to think at all is sexist.
Professor Zelenak criticizes my statement that "'[t]he QTIP's
requirement of giving the surviving spouse less than full ownership
reveals an intention to delude the surviving spouse into accepting
QTIP treatment as if she truly owned the property'" as being even
more degrading to women than the QTIP provisions could be.39 But,
he misreads these words and takes them out of context. I wrote:
Essentially, the current income distribution requirement of
the QTIP provisions is meant to pacify the surviving spouse.
The QTIP's requirement of giving the surviving spouse less
than full ownership reveals an intention to delude the
surviving spouse into accepting QTIP treatment as if she
truly owned the property. Ironically and interestingly,
nowhere else in the transfer tax provisions is a taxpayer
deemed to be owner of more property than he or she either
controls or once controlled.40
A fair reading of that middle sentence in its context would not
equate Congress's intentions with women's actually being deluded
and certainly cannot be equated with Professor Zelenak's reading
that I think "widows are too ignorant or too stupid to understand the
difference between outright ownership and an income interest for
life."' 41 On the contrary, I think widows know well the difference
between an income interest and the property itself, but widows have
not been given the opportunity to choose between those unequal
property interests. Remember they are not consulted about the
QTIP transfer.
Finally, Professor Zelenak states that criticizing the QTIP as
degrading to women is really a frivolous exercise in itself, that such
scholarship is "simply trivial" because the QTIIP affects very few
women who are mostly wealthy and white.42 I hope that this
39. Id. at 1545 n.125 (quoting Gerzog, supra note 1, at 325).
40. Gerzog, supra note 1, at 325.
41. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1545 n.125.
42. See id. at 1548-49.
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statement is an unintentional afterthought. Such an attitude would
chill the writing of any transfer tax criticism since the estate and gift
tax provisions only affect the wealthy. Trying to silence criticism on
the basis that we should somehow all be writing about helping the
poor multitudes belies most tax criticism; we are rarely dealing with
issues that affect the poor. Treating any women, wealthy or not, as if
they did not exist should anger all women and indeed all men. It is
not merely that these women could and should be wealthier, but that
even a wealthy widow is entitled to be free of gender bias. That
should not make anyone less mindful of the hungry and the poor, but
biased and degrading public laws should not escape criticism because
they bias and degrade mostly wealthy white women.

